Radiation protection methodologies concerning individual monitoring, workplace monitoring and environmental monitoring in nuclear fuel facilities have been developed and applied to facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories (NCL) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) for over 40 y. External exposure to photon, beta ray and neutron and internal exposure to alpha emitter are important issues for radiation protection at these facilities. Monitoring of airborne and surface contamination by alpha and beta/photon emitters at workplace is also essential to avoid internal exposure. A critical accident alarm system developed by JAEA has been proved through application at the facilities for a long time. A centralised area monitoring system is effective for emergency situations. Air and liquid effluents from facilities are monitored by continuous monitors or sampling methods to comply with regulations. Effluent monitoring has been carried out for 40 y to assess the radiological impacts on the public and the environment due to plant operation.
INTRODUCTION
In Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories (NCL) of the JAEA Tokai Research Center, Plutonium Fuel Production Facilities 'PFPF' have been operated since 1972 and the total number of 1700 PuO 2 -UO 2 mixed oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies for the experimental fast breeder reactor 'JOYO' have been produced up to the present. Also the Tokai reprocessing plant (TRP), the first nuclear reprocessing pilot plant in Japan with a capacity of 0.7 tU d -1 of spent fuel, has been operated at NCL since 1977 and 1140 tU of spent fuel from light water power reactors and the advanced thermal reactor FUGEN has been successfully reprocessed up to the present.
Radiation protection methodologies and equipment developed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) have been applied to NCL facilities and proved for over 40 y. The purpose of this paper is to review the individual monitoring, workplace monitoring and environmental monitoring which have been proven through these activities.
INDIVIDUAL MONITORING
At MOX facilities, the external exposure caused by low-energy photons emitted from 241 Am and neutrons should be monitored. At reprocessing plants, external exposure caused by photons and beta rays emitted from fission products should be monitored. Therefore, the TLD badge designed by Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC, one of the predecessors of JAEA) for measurement of photons, beta rays and neutrons is used as a personal dosemeter. Moreover, when nuclear fuel material is handled in a glove box, a TLD extremity dosemeter is used for monitoring photons and beta rays. When external exposure measurement is necessary for each radiation work, a semiconductor type dosemeter is used in addition to the TLD badge. In order to prevent an excessive exposure in the radiation work, the data from this dosemeter are transmitted wirelessly and observed remotely.
At MOX facilities, neutron exposure is an important factor to be accounted for the purpose of radiation protection. Therefore, moderated-neutron calibration fields were developed in NCL to simulate neutron spectra in workplace (1) , and several neutron monitors have been calibrated in the fields. Various neutron spectra with average energies ranging from 0.4 to 1.7 MeV can be produced by placing a 252 Cf neutron source surrounded with moderators in combination with steel, graphite and polymethyl methacrylate, at the centre of a large irradiation room and a small room where contribution from the scattered comportment is large. The calculated neutron spectra were in good agreement with the measured ones. These fields can provide realistic neutron spectra similar to those encountered around the glove-boxes of a MOX fuel fabrication process line (2) . As for alpha emitters like plutonium, representing most transuranic elements, which are treated at facilities in NCL, internal exposure would be extremely high even if a small amount of the element were taken into the body. Therefore, in order to prevent internal exposure due to such radionuclides, contamination levels at the workplace are normally kept as low as possible, especially for alpha emitters; there is a zero contamination principle for surfaces and air at workplace.
Individual monitoring of internal exposure for workers in charge of plutonium treating operations has been conducted in routine and special occasions, by the use of lung monitoring and bioassays of excretory samples. For the former, a lung counter equipped with four germanium semiconductor detectors (Canberra; ACT-II Units, crystal size 3800 mm 2 Â25 mm) has been used since 1995 to replace the previous lung counter with NaI(Tl)/CsI(Tl) detectors. The current lung counter was installed in a shielding room with 20-cm thick iron walls to decrease background due to natural radiation. The minimum detectable activity (MDA) for 239 Pu and 241 Am is 4 kBq and 10 Bq, respectively, for a typical measurement time 30 min. For the latter, a traditional method combining anion exchange and alpha spectroscopy has been used since around the 1970s. The MDA of bioassay measurement for alpha emitters of plutonium ( 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 240 Pu) is evaluated to be 4 mBq/excreta sample for a measurement time 80 000 s (3, 4) . In TRP, where various nuclides may exist at a workplace, the measurement of internal exposure in routine individual monitoring is conducted with the use of a whole body counter. In addition, if a radioactive substance were introduced into the body by accident, internal exposure is measured using the bioassay method.
WORKPLACE MONITORING
In order to prevent the spread contamination, worker's contamination is monitored in the work area and at the work room exits, etc. Workers' surface contamination is measured using an alpha and beta surface contamination monitor developed by JAEA (Figure 1) , a hand-and-foot contamination monitor, a foot contamination monitor and a survey meter. This monitor developed by JAEA measures alpha and beta activity on the surfaces of workers' hands, feet and clothes simultaneously. Surface contamination density can be measured at the same time independently, by means of pulse shape discrimination of alpha and beta activity using a ZnS(Ag) and plastic scintillation detectors.
Since alpha rays of radon progeny nuclides exist in the workplace, detecting alpha nuclides such as plutonium at low levels is difficult. Therefore, alpha rays are measured by the energy discrimination method using a solid state detector (SSD). For example, when the surface contamination is detected, in order to judge promptly on the source of contamination (plutonium or radon progeny nuclides), the contaminated surface is measured directly by a portable survey instrument with a SSD to discriminate the energy region of radon progeny. This method is applied to continuous air monitors in the workplace.
When contamination is detected in air or smear samples, it is useful to know the dispersion of contamination to judge whether plutonium or radon progeny nuclides. Therefore, alpha ray autoradiography using the ZnS(Ag) scintillator was developed in NCL. While contamination spots caused by plutonium particles appear bright in autoradiography, those of radon progeny nuclides are dark and small by comparison because the alpha emission is different in the nuclide (Figure 2) . Recently, instead of ZnS(Ag), a method using an imaging plate has been developed (5) . 
CRITICAL ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM
A critical accident alarm system was installed as part of criticality safety management. It includes units that can detect gamma rays or neutron rays emitted in criticality accidents; each unit consists of three plastic scintillation gamma detectors or three solid state neutron detectors with fissile material; here the two out of three voting scheme is implemented in order to increase reliability of detection ( Figure 3 ). The detection threshold of a minimum accident was set as an increase in power of 10 15 fissions/s occurring within a rise-time of between 0.5 ms and 1 s. The sum of neutron and gamma doses of a minimum hypothetical accident (10 15 fissions) is 0.3 Gy at an unshielded distance of 1 m. Dose rate in detector location was determined using parameterisation of results calculated with the MCNP4C code used ENDF/B-VI library and ANISN code used JENDL-3.2 and PHOTX libraries. The energy spectrum of gamma ray and neutron is calculated in MCNP4C, and the permeability of the shield is calculated in ANISN. As a result, setting the alarm trip level of both the gamma detector and the neutron detector at 2.0 mGy h 21 enabled minimum criticality accidents to be detected conservatively. These results were then applied to the new detector locations (6) .
EFFLUENT MONITORING
Airborne effluents from TRP, treated with scrubbing and filtration, are discharged into the atmosphere through three stacks after careful radioactive monitoring. Monitoring is not only carried out by continuous measurement of 85 Kr, 129 I and particulate alpha and beta nuclides based on on-line systems, but also by batch measurements of continuously sampled 14 C and 3 H (7) . Since dominant nuclides in airborne effluent from TRP are radioactive inert gas 85 Kr which arises in the mechanical and dissolution processes, the time-trend of the 85 Kr emission can be observed on-line from the central monitoring system web-page (8) . Annual discharge of 129 I and 14 C are shown in Figure 4 along with the spent fuel reprocessing rate. But even if the operation is stopped, 85 Kr and 3 H are discharged, because the discharge sources of 85 Kr and 3 H are stored in TRP. From March 1996 to July 2000 and from June 2007 to 2010, operation was stopped and no spent fuel was reprocessed (9) . Other nuclides depend on the amount of annually reprocessed spent nuclear fuel. The measurement of 14 C was made according to the recommendation in 1986, and it was begun in 1991.
Liquid effluents from TRP, after distillation or flocculation process treatment and oil removal, are discharged to the sea around 3.7 km from the seashore through an undersea pipeline, after confirming 
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that concentrations of radionuclides are below the limits using a sampling method. The amount and concentrations of airborne and liquid effluents described above are below the allowable limits for established TRP.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, various radiation protection activities performed at NCL are introduced. In Japan, a quality management system based on ISO 9001 was adopted in the field of operational safety of nuclear facilities in 2004. Therefore, since radiation control is one of the most important processes required to achieve safety, our radiation control activities are performed as a quality management system based on the methodology known as Plan-Do-Check-Act. Also, the routine radiation control activities are improved by introducing the R&D results presented here. Moreover, our experience of radiation control at NCL is contributed to improvement of radiation safety of the commercial reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture.
